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OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES ADDS TO A GROWING LITERATURE on the origins of the Financial
Crisis of 2008. Jennifer Taub’s contribution provides one of the most comprehensive studies to date. She
outlines the many causes of the crisis, dispels myths, and explains what has been done—or how little has been
done—in the wake of the crisis, while keeping the perspectives of struggling homeowners front and center.
Taub begins by showing how the 2008 crisis was a continuation of the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s
and 1990s that brought countless farmers and banks to ruin. In both crises, the “same players” operated, she
argues, just under “new names” and in “new institutions with the same frailties.”2 She also reveals how the
United States Congress, under pressure from the saving and loans industry, dismantled the New Deal
regulatory framework, thus allowing savings and loans institutions to operate with much more risk. This
deregulation and “desupervision” of the industry would become an essential cause of the 2008 crisis.
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Other People’s Houses: How Decades 
Of Bailouts, Captive Regulators, And 
Toxic Bankers Made Home Mortgages A 
Thrilling Business, by Jennifer Taub1
KETON MOTTA FREEMAN
OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES ADDS TO A GROWING LITERATURE on the origins of the 
Financial Crisis of 2008. Jennifer Taub’s contribution provides one of the most 
comprehensive studies to date. She outlines the many causes of the crisis, dispels 
myths, and explains what has been done—or how little has been done—in the 
wake of the crisis, while keeping the perspectives of struggling homeowners 
front and center.
Taub begins by showing how the 2008 crisis was a continuation of the 
savings and loans crisis of the 1980s and 1990s that brought countless farmers 
and banks to ruin. In both crises, the “same players” operated, she argues, just 
under “new names” and in “new institutions with the same frailties.”2 She also 
reveals how the United States Congress, under pressure from the saving and loans 
industry, dismantled the New Deal regulatory framework, thus allowing savings 
and loans institutions to operate with much more risk. This deregulation and 
“desupervision” of the industry would become an essential cause of the 2008 crisis.
Taub then follows the story of Washington Mutual (Wa Mu), documenting 
the decisions that led to its collapse. Eager to increase loan volume, WaMu made 
loans to people who would struggle to repay. WaMu extended loans with as little 
1. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014) 302 pages.
2. Ibid at 5.
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as a five per cent down payment, based only on the applicants’ self-declared 
income. These reckless loans were then packaged and sold as securities, receiving 
investment-grade ratings. Institutional investors bought them, either because they 
“did not understand what they were buying … or [they] didn’t bother to learn.”3
Many regulators believed WaMu and other lenders limited the risk they took 
on to protect long-term shareholder wealth. However, this belief was wrong. 
Subprime lending surged, creating a real estate bubble, which then popped. The 
number of borrowers defaulting and foreclosing soared.
Taub then provides a comprehensive overview of legal changes that created 
the “toxic mortgage supply chain” which caused the 2008 crisis.4 She outlines 
how decades of deregulation and desupervision eroded the stability of the 
previous fifty years and reveals how laws enacted in the early 1980s allowed banks 
to sell high-risk mortgages, with higher and variable interest rates. These loans 
where often peddled with fraudulent and predatory practices. Taub identifies 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1993 decision, Nobelman v American Savings 
Bank, as another cause of the crisis, since it prevented debtors in bankruptcy 
from reducing the principal on their mortgage to their home’s depressed market 
value. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shared some of the blame by purchasing 
and guaranteeing high-risk mortgages. Regulatory inaction on the part of the 
Federal Reserve and others also enabled the crisis, as did the legal changes of the 
1980s and the Securities and Exchange Commission regulations that allowed the 
private mortgage securities market to flourish, disguising high-risk mortgages as 
investment-grade securities suitable for institutional investors. Other essential 
causes were the legal changes in 2000 that gave banks more freedom to speculate 
on derivatives, as well as the legal changes that permitted the overleveraging of 
banks and homeowners alike.
Taub’s goal is also to document the effect of the crisis on homeowners, 
reminding us that more than five million families have lost their homes to 
foreclosure.5 In 2013, one-fifth of all mortgaged properties in the United States 
were worth less than their mortgages.6 The effect is to remind the reader that 
while so many banks have been deemed too big to fail, millions of homeowners 
overburdened with debt have been deemed “too small to save.”7 Today, the banks 
are bigger than ever. However, countless homeowners are struggling to keep their 
3. Ibid at 159.
4. Ibid at 245.
5. Ibid at 386.
6. Ibid at 3.
7. Ibid at 118.
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homes and far too often losing them. Taub effectively shows us what caused the 
2008 crisis, how damaging the crisis has been to homeowners, and how little has 
been done to help them since.
